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- Abstract -
The Porter Hypothesis, Property Rights, and Innovation Offsets:
The Case of Southwest Michigan Pork Producers
The Porter Hypothesis relates the effects of environmental regulation on (a) technological
innovation and (b) economic performance. Specifically, it asserts that innovation offsets can
occur. These are a type of technological change that will “partially or more than fully offset the
costs of complying with environmental regulation” (Porter and van der Linde, 1995, p. 98). The
hypothesis has been highly debated, in part, because nomenclature has been careless. Also, the
role of property rights in defining innovation offsets has been neglected. If the Porter Hypothesis
has validity in agriculture, its policy implications are important. Recent changes in agro-
environmental legislation provides an opportunity to more thoroughly investigate the hypothesis
and its implications.1
Introduction
The “Porter Hypothesis” (Porter and van der Linde, 1995a) asserts that through technical
change “policies mandating strict environmental compliance have [the] potential to make
American firms and industries more competitive” (Thurow and Holt, 1997, p. 20). Porter and van
der Linde (1995b) take issue with the usual economic textbook assumption that, because a firm is
presumed to be maximizing profits, any profitable opportunities to improve environmental
performance will be automatically undertaken. Any regulations requiring more environmental
performance, therefore, can come only at a cost. Specifically, Porter and van der Linde take issue
with the idea that pollution is only inefficient if it can be prevented for less expenditures than what
it costs a firm to deal with it once it is created. They point to cases where innovation offsets–cost
reductions due to technological change in response to environmental regulations–have resulted in
“win-win” situations where both profits and environmental performance have improved. 
The hypothesis has generated considerable debate. While Porter and van der Linde
contend that these innovation offsets are likely to be common and large, others have disagreed
(Gardiner and Portney, 1994; Palmer, Oates, and Portney, 1995; Thurow and Holt, 1997; Jaffe
and Palmer, 1997). For example, Palmer et al. (1995) note their strong dispute with the Porter
hypothesis; they argue that environmental regulation does indeed involve tradeoffs, that the cost
of regulation will be neither negligible nor non-existent.
Studies of the Porter hypothesis to-date have focused on the process of innovation, the
effects on R&D expenditures, and inventive output (Ferrante, 1998; Jaffe and Palmer, 1997).
These studies have mainly been framed in the context of the manufacturing sector. There is some
empirical evidence that innovation offsets are not common in the manufacturing industry (Palmer,2
et al., 1995). Few studies, however, have investigated the existence of innovation offsets in
agriculture. 
This paper explores the Porter hypothesis as it relates to the existence of innovation
offsets in agriculture–specifically for swine farmers in Michigan. It begins with an examination of
the concept of innovation offsets. We argue that debating whether pollution is inefficient and
therefore whether innovation offsets are “improvements in efficiency due to investments in
reducing environmental damage” (Thurow and Holt, 1997, p. 20) is not appropriate when
environmental regulations result in major changes in the property right structure. We further
argue that the concept of “bounded rationality” can be used to explain how an institutional change
such as a new agro-environmental regulation can change firm (producer) behavior toward
adoption of profitable pollution prevention innovations. We conclude by using the concept of
innovation offsets to frame a forthcoming empirical study addressing impacts of agro-
environmental regulation.
Efficiency and Innovation Offsets
First, we explore the relationship between efficiency and innovation offsets. Is pollution an
inefficiency, a waste, the correction of which yields innovation offsets?  No, identifying
inefficiency as the source of innovation offsets is not appropriate. Consider the concept of
efficiency. Assume a firm is using the most efficient production function given a property right
structure. If a new property right structure is implemented, and, in response, the firm adopts some
new technology, this adoption expands a firm’s production possibility set. It is not correct to call
this adoption an improvement in efficiency, rather, this is an expansion in the firm’s production
opportunities.3This section draws from Schmid, 1987.
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This conclusion is reinforced by a careful examination of property rights. Property rights
are rules that define what has to be taken into account in economic decisions and activity
3. They
specify a firm’s opportunity set; thereby influencing the firm’s behavior. Property rights both
constrain and liberate behavior by influencing benefits and costs, and their distribution. As Schmid
(1987) notes, property rights describe the relationship of one agent to another with respect to a
resource. If one owns the property right to a natural resource, the owner is able to create costs for
others. Thus, “one person’s right is another’s cost” (p. 9).
Consider an example. Let A own the property right to a natural resource and let B be
affected - incur costs - from A’s ownership. As Schmid notes, in order to “reduce the external
effects on B of A’s acts is to increase the external effects on A of B’s acts” (p. 10). Thus, the
allocation of property rights directs the distribution of benefits and costs. Therefore, a change in
property rights can expand one’s opportunity set by providing the owner with new benefits and
the ability to shift costs to others. This expanded opportunity set will affect the choices and
actions, or behavior, of the owner and those affected. This change in economic behavior in turn
affects economic performance.
Specifically, assume that Firm A holds the property right to use a body of surface water
for disposal of waste residues. The service provided by the surface water as a sink for Firm A’s
discharges is a free input into A’s production process although this use clearly results in costs to
society in terms of sustained environmental damages. Firm A is able to create costs for society
due to its ownership of the property right.4
Now, let the institutional structure change for some reason, perhaps due to changing
societal preferences. Society now holds the property right to a certain level of clean water. Firm A
is no longer able to freely discharge into the surface water, rather, society now dictates that A is
limited in how much pollution it can discharge. If it discharges more than it is allowed, it must pay
a fine that increases as the limit is exceeded. 
Clearly, the levels and distribution of benefits and costs to both Firm A and society have
changed. Society now benefits from cleaner water, but firm A incurs direct costs in using water
that it did not earlier. Society’s opportunity set has expanded while A’s has diminished. 
Efficiency, the maximization of the net social benefits, then is a function of the prevailing
property rights structure. Under the initial pre-environmental regulation property rights structure,
a firm’s discharges are not an inefficiency. For Firm A, water was a free input and there was no
incentive for it to economize on its use of the resource. After the change in property rights, water
use does entail a direct cost for Firm A. Under this new post-regulation property rights structure
and prices, the profit-maximizing firm will want to reduce its use of water for pollution disposal.
Thus, environmental regulations provide incentives for the firm to reduce pollution because the
change in property rights makes pollution a direct cost for the firm, not just for society.
Thus, innovation offsets are due to an induced innovation; they result in both an increase
in profits and an improvement in environmental quality. They do not result from improvements in
efficiency. Rather, once benefits and costs change, profits for A are modified since it now bears a
cost for improving environmental quality. Depending upon the technology adopted by Firm A in
response to the environmental regulation, innovation offsets may or may not occur. Theoretically4Adapted from Batie, 1997.
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it is only known that a change in benefits and costs changes economic performance. Whether
profits improve is an empirical question.
Behavior Implications
How does Firm A react to the new property right structure?  Can Firm A offset its
increased production costs which stem from compliance with the new water quality requirements? 
Hicks’ induced innovation hypothesis provides insight:
A change in relative prices of the factors of production is itself a sign to invention,
and to invention of a particular kind -- directed to economizing the use of a factor
which has become relatively expensive (Hicks, 1932).
The change in property rights has caused the relative cost of water to increase for Firm A.
It follows from Hicks’ induced innovation hypothesis that Firm A will reduce the amount of water
that it uses for pollution disposal. Firm A will choose from a vector of existing technologies that
change its production process in such a fashion as to reduce its water use for pollution disposal. It
will invest in ways to meet its new constraints at lower costs. 
A Simple Model of Innovation Offsets
With the implementation of the environmental regulation, and the change in property
rights, pollution is now a cost for Firm A. How innovation offsets occur can now be seen with the
following simple model
4. Economic theory predicts that Firm A will reduce its use of water in
order to minimize costs, and perhaps improve profits given that it must meet a new environmental
standard. Figure 1 illustrates the effect of this induced technical change. The production
possibility frontier (PPF) depicts the feasible set of water quality and profits that are produced by6
Profit
Environmental Quality
Figure 1:  Innovation Offsets












Firm A. Water quality is measured on the X-axis; it increases as one moves from left to right.
Profit is on the Y-axis.
Before the environmental regulation, Firm A is at point A1 on the production possibility
frontier (PPF), labeled PPF1. At this point it earns P1 profits and generates a water quality level5The technology that is adopted by Firm A could be biased towards profits or environmental quality, in
which case the outer boundary would be closer to the respective axis.  For illustrative purposes though, the PPF is
assumed to take the shape shown.
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equal to W1. Since water is a free input for A, it will likely be close to the Y-axis since it does not
bear any direct costs from water degradation.
Now let an environmental performance standard be implemented, one which specifies the
maximum amount of ambient pollution that can be allowed from Firm A. Let the minimum level
of ambient water quality that A must meet be WP. At point A1 it is clear that Firm A is producing
too much pollution and must move to at least A2 along the frontier PPF1. Here Firm A earns
profits P2 which are less than P1, but produces less pollution. Thus the costs that Firm A must
now bear due to the change in property rights has reduced its profits, and forced it to produce a
different set of output levels than when it was owner of the property right. These are compliance
costs that A must incur to be in compliance with the new environmental regulation. It is clear that
there is a trade-off between profits and improved environmental quality for Firm A.
But A is a profit-maximizing company, and Hicks’ induced innovation hypothesis says the
firm will seek out technologies that lower compliance costs (and improve water quality). Thus,
after some time, A shifts out to a new frontier, labeled PPF2
5. This shift in the production
possibility frontier is an induced innovation. But where will Firm A be on the new PPF?  Given
the performance standard, it must be to the right of WP. If it is on any part of PPF2 below the
horizontal line (P1), Firm A earns less profits than it did without the environmental regulation.
Environmental quality, though, improves. Points along this lower portion of PPF2 are not
innovation offsets. If Firm A repositions itself on this part of the frontier, economic performance,
as measured by innovation offsets, does not improve.6Innovation offsets have been defined somewhat differently elsewhere in the literature; while improving
environmental quality, they reduce compliance costs, but do not necessarily increase profits. An example of this
would be any point along PPF2 where Firm A reduces its compliance costs by earning a profit level greater than P2,
but less than P1. A’s profits relative to its initial point A1 do not increase. This definition of innovation offset is not
used in this study.
7This is in contrast with the model of innovation in abatement technology used by Palmer, et al. (1995). 
They conclude that stricter environmental regulation makes a firm unambiguously worse off.  This result is based
upon the assumption of perfect information (p. 123).  But this assumption may not hold for various reasons,
explored later.
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The only section that results in an innovation offsets is that part of PPF2 that lies to the
right of vertical line, WP, and above the horizontal line, P1.
6 All points on this section of PPF2,
such as point A3, result in higher profits and improved water quality. Firm A’s profits increase
due to technical innovation as does environmental quality.
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Does this mean that Porter and van der Linde were correct and their critics wrong?  Not
so. Critics (Gardiner and Portney, 1994; Palmer et al., 1995) are correct in stating that we cannot
have it all. This conclusion is seen from Figure 1. There is an opportunity cost to any position
along both frontiers, including PPF2; there is a tradeoff between profits and environmental quality
due to scarcity of resources. In fact, this tradeoff will always exist regardless of the technology
that is adopted. If the regulatory performance standard did not have to be met, the firm could
improve profits at the cost of lower water quality. Regardless of this tradeoff, the change in
property rights can make a firm more profitable, if such previously unexploited technologies can
be found that result in innovation offsets.
Bounded Rationality and Innovation Offsets
The potential existence of induced innovation and innovation offsets raises the question as
to why, under normal operating circumstances, firms do not pursue all profitable opportunities for
new products and processes (Gardiner and Portney, 1994; Palmer et al., 1995; Jaffe and Palmer,8The authors wish to thank A.A. Schmid for this intellectual contribution.
9It should be added that if the changes in institutions are strong enough, direct sanctions may not be
needed to change the behavior of managers.
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1997). Critics of the Porter Hypothesis tend to assume perfect information, which does not hold
in the real world. Moreover, bounded rationality prohibits managers from considering all possible
profitable opportunities
8. The set of information considered by managers is influenced by such
things as prices, institutional factors such as business custom, firm culture, social culture, and
property rights.
But changes in any of the above institutions, perhaps due to citizen movements, political
response, or changes in property rights, can cause managers to change their agenda and widen the
set of information they use. Managers may respond by searching for innovations that reduce
pollution
9. Once bounded rationality is acknowledged, it can be seen that institutional changes can
change behavior, and do affect which, among the large number of profitable possibilities, come to
the attention of managers.
In addition, there may be profitable paths that firms can pursue, but explicitly do not
follow because returns to investments must exceed a specified “hurdle rate” or certainty payback
threshold. Simple measures like payback thresholds are used due to bounded rationality; they help
managers focus their attention by allowing them to deal with a subset of their entire knowledge.
Furthermore, it may be that managers only pay attention to some profitable processes
because they become more valuable with the environmental regulation than without it. For
instance, without the environmental regulation some process or product may have returned 10
percent on the investment, but with the change in property rights, and its ensuing changes in10
benefits and costs, the return could be 30 percent. This process may only be pursued now that it
surpasses the minimum certainty payback threshold.
The simple model that was presented earlier, however, assumes technical efficiency, which
can result from perfect information. Are innovation offsets still possible if this perfect information
assumption is relaxed?  Consider point A4 in Figure 1. Assume that initially Firm A is at point A4,
inside the PPF1. This position may be due to the reasons mentioned above, such as “bounded
rationality.” Next a performance standard of WP is implemented. The change in property rights
may force the firm to the frontier PPF1. The firm experiences innovation offsets only if the new
location on PPF1 is to the northeast of A4. Here profits increase and environmental quality
improves.
Of course there can be a situation where the performance level is set so high that no
innovation offsets are possible. Thus the possibility of innovation offsets, when information is
imperfect and bounded rationality exists, is dependent upon where the performance standard is
set. An improvement in economic performance is ambiguous.
The Case of Southwest Michigan Pork Producers
Jaffe and Palmer (1997) suggest that one interpretation of the Porter hypothesis is that
certain types of environmental regulations–such as those that focus on outcomes and not
processes–stimulate innovation. Few studies have investigated innovation offsets in agriculture,
perhaps because there are so few agro-environmental performance standards. Since 1998,
however, the Environmental Protection Agency has specified that states must implement Water
Quality Standards (WQS) for phosphorous loadings into surface waters in the state that do not
meet the set water quality standard. This regulation does not specify any technology that must be11
used, rather, in the agricultural non-point pollution context, the choice is left to farmer. This new
requirement for environmental regulations that specify agro-environmental performance standards
provides an opportunity for study of the Porter hypothesis and the existence of innovation offsets.
What type of innovation, or technical change, will occur in response to these performance
standards?  The process of technical change and the adoption of technology is not well
understood, whether in response to environmental legislation, or without it. Technical change is
often described as a dynamic two-stage process (Chavas, Aliber, and Cox, 1997): 1) the creation
of new knowledge and technology, and 2) the adoption of new technology by firms. Expenditures
on R&D generate new knowledge, but since acquiring knowledge and adapting it is costly, the
adoption process can be slow. Note that both stages of technical change can be induced by
regulatory stipulations.
A forthcoming case study of southwestern Michigan swine producers will focus on the
effect of this new property right structure and the performance standard (WQS) on technology
adoption behavior of pork producers. Southwestern Michigan Pork Producers were selected for
the case study since they are located in an area where maximum daily load performance standards
for phosphorus from livestock production will require changes in farming practices or systems.
The situation is complicated by the fact that some producers are contractees, some are
independent, and all are experiencing a rapidly consolidating industrial structure. Some have large
recent investments in fixed assets, others are more flexible. The producers are in different stages
of their careers.
While the research is just starting, we anticipate that we will identify suites of
technologies–from changed farm practices to whole farm redesign to changed hog diets–and then12
we will estimate the impact of these technologies on phosphorus loadings for specific farm
locations. We will also estimate the impact on profits. Probit models of adoption will be
developed that include the unique characteristics of the enterprise and the decision-maker. These
unique characteristics will be identified–via a detailed personal interview–based on the information
set viewed as important by the producer. That is, out of all possible profitable opportunities for
the farm firm, which are considered most important and why. Similarly, the decision-makers
response to the foreseeable performance standard will be explored, in part by viewing the
performance standard as a shift in the relative price of waste disposal to other activities. In
addition, we plan–through survey questions–to obtain some insight into the dynamics of land
grant expenditures on research and development that would minimize the costs of compliance for
phosphorous performance standards. Through this investigation we will be able to investigate the
applicability of the simple model presented earlier and the role played by changing property rights
structure in orienting producers to seek out innovation offsets.
Summary
If the Porter hypothesis has validity in agriculture, the policy implications are important.
They are that, if agro-environmental regulations are designed as performance standards:  these
regulations may be more cost-effective than other non-point pollution strategies, they may focus
producer and contractor attention to search for innovation offsets, and they may induce
innovation by redirecting R&D expenditures to cost minimizing pollution prevention technologies.
Because of recent changes in agro-environmental policy, research can be directed at the validity of
the hypothesis in an agricultural context.13
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